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Rex M. Shoyama†

Introduction

I. Intelligent Agents

C

T

he term ‘‘intelligent agent’’ refers to an entity with
characteristics of intelligent human behaviour. 2
Intelligent software agents (often deployed on the
Internet for e-commerce related activities) have a
number of important properties, but the two most significant are their (1) autonomous behaviour; and (2)
capacity for decentralized action. 3 An autonomous
system is often defined as one that has the ability to
control its own actions and act without the intervention
of humans or other agents. 4 Intelligent agents act in a
decentralized manner if they work together to solve a
complex problem, even though there is no central control over the agents and they are distributed in different
parts of an environment. 5 These technical characteristics
of intelligent agents help to make them very efficient at
searching for and organizing information on a wide-scale
in environments such as the Internet. 6 Intelligent agents
thus have the potential to be very useful in many practical applications and will do the work that humans
cannot or do not want to do.

anadian copyright law continues to undergo extensive reform and reinterpretation due to rapid technological change. Computer-generated works present
challenges to copyright law, and there is a need to consider these challenges in light of the ongoing maturing of
artificial intelligence technologies. This paper discusses
some of the implications of the application of copyright
to works created by ‘‘intelligent agents’’. A specific
example that will be revisited throughout this paper is
the use of intelligent agents to gather, summarize, and
present news that is available on the Internet. The intelligent news agent example is a particularly useful one to
consider for the reason that it has vast commercial applicability and has the potential to be the subject of intellectual property litigation. 1
The central objective of this article is to propose a
clarification of copyright law as applied to works created
by intelligent agents. In Part I, the concepts of artificial
intelligence and intelligent agents are introduced. Part II
identifies the challenges that are presented to the tests of
originality and authorship in the application of copyright
to works generated by intelligent agents. It is argued that
works created by intelligent agents may meet the tests of
originality and authorship. It is also argued that the concepts of ‘‘author’’, ‘‘owner’’, and ‘‘maker’’ are distinct from
one another in Canadian copyright law. Part III addresses
copyright policy arguments. It is shown that intelligent
agents may be authors of works but not owners of copyright, and that there is no clear candidate who should be
designated the maker of works created by intelligent
agents. The role of the public domain is also considered,
and it is concluded that the best solution is for no copyright ownership to be vested in anyone. Database protection legislation is examined in Part IV. The paper concludes with some suggestions that should be considered
as part of the ongoing process of Canadian copyright law
reform.

There are a number of legal uncertainties that result
from the introduction of intelligent agents onto the
Internet. Two examples include the determination of
contract formation (when agents are introduced as
intermediaries between contracting parties) and liability
for the misbehaviour of agents. 7 These legal uncertainties
are not merely academic musings. One only need
examine a case such as eBay, Inc. v. Bidder’s Edge, Inc. 8
(which involved the use of software ‘‘bots’’ by Bidder’s
Edge to create a database of items available on other
auction Web sites by copying information on those Web
sites) to understand that intelligent agents pose very practical legal concerns.
As intelligent agent technologies advance, it
becomes more and more possible for computers to be
‘‘creative’’, in the sense that their output will decreasingly
resemble traditional computer output. As natural lan-
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guage processing capabilities increase, intelligent agents
will create more ‘‘human-like’’ output. For example, as
early as 1993, Scott French attempted to create a heuristically based expert system that would write in the style of
a human author. 9
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It is logical, then, for owners and users of intelligent
agents to want to exploit value from and protect the
creations that are output by the agent and the knowledge that the agent has accumulated. As a result, there is
potential for dispute and litigation in situations where
the owner or user of an agent feels that a third party has
misappropriated the work done by the agent. Who has
the legal right in the creations and knowledge generated
by an intelligent agent? Are copyright laws nuanced
enough to deal with the struggle over the ownership of
content that will result from the use of intelligent agents?
Since the creations in question are generated by an agent
through its own autonomous actions, a fundamental
issue is the copyrightability of computer-generated
works. There are a number of interesting examples
already in existence that illustrate the difficulty in
applying copyright law to computer-generated works.
Professor Harold Cohen has created an artificial
intelligence-based software program called ‘‘AARON’’
that creates visual art. 10 By simply running the AARON
program on a computer, a user of the program can have
AARON create original paintings with no user-input
whatsoever. Each painting that a particular copy of the
AARON program creates is unique and different from
any other painting that is created by it or any other copy
of AARON running on another computer. Computer
generated musical compositions 11 and fractals 12 are
other examples of works that challenge current copyright law. It is unclear whether copyright exists in such
computer-generated works, and who the rightful owner
of such a copyright would be.
On the Internet, there is an increasing demand for
‘‘news bots’’ that will deliver news feeds and headlines
from various news sources and Web sites around the
world directly to the reader. 13 In an effort to increase the
efficiency of news searching and to better personalize
access to news on the Internet, researchers have undertaken to create intelligent agents that will have, in addition to numerous other features, the ability to summarize the news items that they gather. 14 In a clever eightminute flash media movie entitled EPIC 2014, 15 a hypothetical future merger of Google and Amazon is
presented wherein ‘‘Googlezon’’ is born. Googlezon constructs news stories dynamically, stripping facts from
numerous content sources and recombining them to
create a customized news story for a particular user. For
example, in putting together a domestic news story,
Googlezon could emphasize the international aspects
and implications of the story for a reader who is interested in international news. 16 Whether or not copyright
subsists in such computer-generated news summaries is
questionable.
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In addition to the valuable information output by
intelligent agents, the agent may also accumulate knowledge within its own internal ‘‘knowledge base’’. Simply
put, a knowledge base is a set of representations of facts
about the world. 17 For example, as a shopping agent
travels the world (the Internet), it may gather valuable
marketing and customer preference information. 18 A
news-gathering agent might gather knowledge about the
currency and/or breadth of subject matter found at particular news Web sites. 19 As this type of information is
incorporated into its knowledge base, the agent will
‘‘learn’’ and adjust its behaviour. This constant mutation
by agents (in a manner comparable to viruses) is sometimes referred to as ‘‘polymorphism’’. 20 Thus, agents will
act in unpredictable ways and produce unpredictable
results, further complicating the legal analysis of copyright in the works generated by the agents.
The question of ownership over the creations and
knowledge generated by intelligent agents may be made
more difficult where there are competing ownership
claims of a number of different parties who are
somehow associated with the intelligent agent. 21 For
example, one party may patent certain technologies used
in the agent, while another party may copyright the
software code composing the agent. If the agent contains
the personal/private data of other third parties, these
third parties may have some claims to that data. There is
also an end-user that has paid money for the right to use
the agent. Finally, there is also likely an investor who has
been instrumental in the creation of the intelligent agent
in the first place. Do any of these parties have a proper
copyright ownership claim to the works generated by
intelligent agents?

II. Canadian Copyright Law

I

n Canada, the Subcommittee on the Revisions of the
Copyright tabled a report 22 in 1985 that considered
computer-assisted creations of works and concluded that
copyright in any protected work should be vested in the
individual or entity principally responsible for the
making of the work. 23 In the United States, Congress
created the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) in 1976 to
address the problem. 24 CONTU came to the conclusion
that the user of the program is the author of the work
and expressed certainty that for works created with computer assistance, a computer could not contribute to
authorship of the works created. 25 However, in 1986, the
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
noted that CONTU’s conclusion that computers are
inert tools of creation may be misleading, and raised the
possibility for authorship in computers. 26 The technological context and surrounding circumstances have
changed dramatically in recent years. Two major
changes are apparent.
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First, nearly two decades have passed, and artificial
intelligence technologies have advanced rapidly in
recent years, to the point that intelligent agents are not
so much assisting the creation of works, but generating
them autonomously. OTA’s concern that the analysis by
CONTU begs the question of whether the computer is a
creator or not 27 is even more apparent now than it was
in 1986. The same may be said about the analysis of the
Subcommittee on the Revisions of the Copyright in
Canada.
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Second, the data at the disposal of intelligent agents
on the Internet is far more dynamic and decentralized
than could have been imagined twenty years ago. The
manner in which data and instructions are presented to
agents is much different from what is normally associated with a ‘‘computer-assisted’’ production. There is a
distinct difference between a computer program that
requires a person to control and supply information to it,
and intelligent agents that can autonomously gather
information from numerous sources in a highly dynamic
and decentralized environment such as the Internet. The
significance of the decentralized and highly distributed
nature of many intelligent agent programs is that the
unpredictability of the resulting works is exacerbated by
the fact that agents may collaborate with and delegate
tasks to other software agents and do so across multiple
Web sites. 28
Can and should copyright be applied to works generated by intelligent agents? If the answer is yes, then
who should be assigned ownership of the copyright? The
answer to these questions depends on whether the
works meet the test of originality, and whether intelligent agents may be considered ‘‘authors’’ under the
Canadian Copyright Act. 29 There is no explicit reference
to intelligent agents or computer-generated works in the
Copyright Act, so there is little direct legislative guidance. 30 Canada is in the process of extensive copyright
reform, but there does not appear to be anything on the
agenda dealing with this particular problem. 31 Additionally, the Copyright Act does not define the term ‘‘original’’, nor does it define the term ‘‘author’’, so it is up to
the courts to determine what exactly these terms mean.

Originality
Canada’s test for originality was recently considered
by the Supreme Court in its decision in CCH Canadian
v. Law Society of Upper Canada. 32 This case had been
heavily anticipated as being a decision that would be a
landmark ruling on what has often been characterized as
a battle between the ‘‘sweat of brow’’ understanding of
copyright and the ‘‘creativity’’ model of copyright. 33 The
Court ultimately concluded that the correct interpretation of the meaning of ‘‘original’’ falls in between these
two competing models of copyright, stating that an exercise of skill and judgment is required to attract copyright
protection. In particular, the Court stated that ‘‘[t]his
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exercise of skill and judgment will necessarily involve
intellectual effort. The exercise of skill and judgment
required to produce the work must not be so trivial that
it could be characterized as a purely mechanical exercise.’’ 34
What are the specific implications of this ruling for
intelligent agents? First of all, it should be noted that
there is some debate as to whether the Supreme Court
has truly created a standard of originality that lies in
between the two competing models of copyright. It has
been argued by one commentator that, ‘‘[t]he level of
originality as defined by the Supreme Court is functionally almost impossible to distinguish from the ‘modicum
of creativity’ approach of Feist’’. 35 Whether or not
Canada has adopted a standard of ‘‘creativity’’ similar to
the United States may affect the ability to attach copyright to works produced by an agent.
In CCH Canadian, in holding that case summaries
are original, the Court stated that a
. . . summary of judicial reasons is not simply a copy of the
original reasons. Even if the summary often contains the
same language as the judicial reasons, the act of choosing
which portions to extract and how to arrange them in the
summary requires an exercise of skill and judgment. 36

In fact, a close analogy can be made between the
activity of an intelligent agent that summarizes news and
that of the publishers in the CCH Canadian case. Just as
with the summary of judicial reasons in the CCH Canadian case, an intelligent news agent must choose the
portions of information available to it on the Internet
and arrange them into a news summary readable to a
human. In fact, the activity of an intelligent news agent
appears to exhibit a greater level of originality than a
summary of judicial reasons pertaining to a single case.
The news agent is required to select from numerous
sources of information and determine the relevancy of
each instead of summarizing one single document. Thus,
it seems that computer-generated works will not necessarily be held to be unoriginal in Canada.
An important consequence of the incorporation of
artificial intelligence into intelligent agents is that they
will increasingly make decisions and judgments that are
unpredictable. 37 The agents will not act in a deterministic manner, like regular software, and it will be highly
unlikely that any two agents will create the same output.
Each agent will likely develop its own ‘‘writing style’’ as it
traverses the Internet, gathering information and
building on its knowledge base. As its knowledge base
expands, the agent will ‘‘learn’’ and increasingly behave
in a unique manner. The result of this non-deterministic
behaviour is the creation of information that neither
another agent nor another human is likely to create. This
is significant because it is arguable that the test for creativity (thus showing originality) may be formulated in
the following manner: ‘‘would another author likely
have created the same ‘work’ in the same context?’’ 38
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It seems then that there is nothing in Canadian law
that precludes computer-generated works from copyright protection on the basis of a lack of originality.
However, can an intelligent agent be found an ‘‘author’’
for the purposes of copyright? A first blush, this might
seem like a ridiculous proposition. It certainly seems
implicit in the Copyright Act that authors must be
human. 39 It is highly doubtful that the legislature contemplated giving copyright to non-humans. However,
even though the answer to this question may seem selfevident, it is still a question worth examining because
the exercise of determining authorship is fundamental to
determining the copyright status of a work. The important notion of authorship is often neglected, even though
it grounds copyright. 40 A close examination of the concept of authorship reveals that this concept is not as
unambiguous as one might think, and thus offers some
insight into Canadian copyright legislation.
From the Copyright Act, it appears that if a human
author cannot be identified, there may be no copyright. 41 At the same time, as discussed already, there is a
very strong argument that intelligent agents are creating
original works that should attract copyright protection.
This causes tension because originality is the overarching
standard of authorship, 42 but at the same time, it is difficult to identify a human author for computer-generated
works. 43
It might be argued that while intelligent agents
exhibit the requisite characteristics to be the author, they
are in fact still just a tool being used by a person who is
making the necessary arrangements for the creation of
the work. Are the users of intelligent agents the proper
authors of the works generated by intelligent agents?
One analogy that has been employed by commentators
in order to argue in favour of granting authorship to the
users of computer programs is that of a person taperecording a live performance of music. It has been
argued that because the person tape-recording the performance is the author of the recording despite having a
limited contribution (pressing the record button), then a
user that simply clicks a mouse button should similarly
be considered the author of computer-generated
output. 44 This particular argument does not have much
weight in Canada, due to the existence of what are
known as ‘‘neighbouring rights’’ in the Copyright Act.
The performer of live music is given the right to fix the
performance and reproduce that fixation. 45
Another analogy made by commentators arguing
for authorship to be attributed to users of computer
programs is that of a photographer who takes a photo
using a highly sophisticated camera. 46 Modern computerized cameras have advanced image-processing functions and automated features like autofocus that have
the ability to make the job of photography little more
than the pressing of a shutter.
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However, there are some problems with the analogy
between cameras and intelligent agents. First, a photographer may control lighting, camera angles, and the positioning of objects in order to construct a final image.
This is not true for users of intelligent agents. Users of
intelligent agents have little or no control over the final
work created by agents. Also, unlike photographs, there
are competing claims to authorship (such as by the
programmer of the agent), and the user has no preconceived conception of the final work that is created. 47
The same commentator who argues that computergenerated works are analogous to photographs notes that
true artificial intelligence is ‘‘a mode of expression whose
capabilities, contours, and directions are even less predictable than the future of computer programs . . .’’. 48
Even based on this commentator’s own description of
artificial intelligence, a user could never possibly ‘‘construct’’ the final output of an intelligent agent due to the
unpredictable nature of the computer-generated work.
Thus, the analogy between camera and intelligent agent
is not a particularly strong one.
Originality is the touchstone for determining
authorship, and a computer program user who contributes little or no creative control over the final work
should not be considered an author. If the individual
who introduces originality into a work is the proper
author, it seems then that an argument may be advanced
in favour of delineating computer programmers as the
authors of computer-generated works. However, due to
the highly unpredictable nature of intelligent agents, it is
questionable whether or not a programmer should be
considered to be the one who introduced the original
expression into the works. The programmer cannot possibly conceive what output the intelligent agents will
create. 49 In addition to the questionable claim that programmers are the source of originality in the works,
there is an even more immediate doctrinal problem
facing the authorship claim of programmers. Authors are
generally considered to be those who cause the fixation
of the work, and programmers do not do so. 50
The question is still open as to whether a nonhuman intelligent agent qualifies as an ‘‘author’’ in
Canada. The legislature has nowhere explicitly defined
an ‘‘author’’ in the Copyright Act as having to be human.
In leaving the term ‘‘author’’ undefined, to what extent
was this concept expected to be stretched in the future? 51
Regardless of the level of artificial intelligence actually
exhibited by agents, and though they are easy subjects
for anthropomorphism, it is clear that agents are
machines and not human. 52 Laws usually only apply to
humans or juridical persons, and not machines.
International law is also somewhat unhelpful with
respect to this issue. A very strong argument can be made
for the requirement that an author be a natural person,
by looking at the text of the Berne Convention. The
proposition is supported by the fact that there is a min-
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imal requirement for the protection of moral rights, 53
and according moral rights to an intelligent agent does
not make sense. It has also been argued that human
authorship is, ‘‘[t]he leitmotiv running through all the
categories of works presently protected by the Convention’’. 54

Authors, Makers, and Owners

✄ REMOVE

Username: zulika

Date: 22-AUG-06

Seq: 5
Filename: D:\reports\cjlt\articles\04_02\shoyama.dat

At first glance, the copyright legislation of the
United Kingdom appears to be quite helpful, since it is
one of the few countries in the world that has enacted
specific copyright provisions with respect to computergenerated works. 56 In the U.K., the author of the work is
‘‘the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the
creation of the work are undertaken’’. 57 This would
appear to settle the issue in the U.K. A policy decision
was made there, presumably on the basis that it simply
does not make sense to make the agent the bearer of
rights, and thus a human author is deemed for computer-generated works. There is nothing wrong with
making a decision that machines cannot be rights
holders. However, a problem does lie in the wording of
the statute. It conflates authorship with the vesting of
ownership, which leads to considerable incoherence. 58
Just because the U.K. legislature has decided that a particular human may be the best choice for ownership of a
copyright computer-generated work, it does not directly
follow that this human should be found the ‘‘author’’.
The lack of existence of a human author for a given
work does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that an
author does not exist. At the risk of being repetitive,
owners are not necessarily authors.

Time: 10:33

Conversely, it might be argued that the Berne Convention is in fact neutral on this topic. First of all, much
like the Canadian Copyright Act, the Berne Convention
does not define the term ‘‘author’’. The reasoning behind
this lack of definition has been pointed to as evidence of
Berne’s neutrality on this topic, since ‘‘[t]he Berne Convention Guide states that this is because ‘national laws
diverge widely, some recognizing only natural persons as
authors, while others treat certain legal entities as copyright owners.’’’ 55 Legal persons such as corporations are
clearly non-human.

While there is no legislation specific to computergenerated works in the Copyright Act, there are some
provisions specific to cinematographic works and sound
recordings. Sections 2 and 2.11 of the Copyright Act
contain very similar wording to subsection 9(3) of the
U.K. Copyright, Design and Patent Act within it. However, the Canadian legislature appears to have intended
to avoid the conflation of authorship with the vesting of
ownership by specifically defining a ‘‘maker’’:
s. 2 ‘‘maker’’ means
(a) in relation to a cinematographic work, the person
by whom the arrangements necessary for the
making of the work are undertaken, or
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(b) in relation to a sound recording, the person by
whom the arrangements necessary for the first fixation of the sounds are undertaken
s. 2.11 For greater certainty, the arrangements referred to in
paragraph (b) of the definition ‘‘maker’’ in section 2, as that
term is used in section 19, and in the definition ‘‘eligible
maker’’ in section 79, include arrangements for entering
into contracts with performers, financial arrangements and
technical arrangements required for the first fixation of the
sounds for a sound recording. [Emphasis Added] 59

Cinematographic works and sound recordings are
similar to computer-generated works in the sense that
vesting ownership in the author poses problems. Individual contributors to a film or a sound recording are
certainly ‘‘authors’’, but the multiplicity of creators
makes the management of copyright in the final work
unwieldy. 60 The Canadian solution to this problem is to
vest copyright in a ‘‘maker’’, the person who is responsible for making the arrangements necessary to create
the work. That ‘‘person’’ can be a corporation. 61 This is
different from the approach in the United States, which
explicitly gives corporations that produce cinematographic works or sound recordings ‘‘authorship’’ status
under the work-for-hire doctrine. Canadian law makes it
clear that a ‘‘maker’’ is distinct and different from an
‘‘author’’. 62
In many cases, the ‘‘maker’’ will have made financial
and logistical contributions that make the production of
the work possible, but will have not made any creative or
technical contribution. 63 While the maker retains copyright over the final cinematographic work or sound
recording, the individual contributors to the work as a
whole remain ‘‘authors’’ and retain copyright to their
individual contributions. In this sense, the Canadian law
is relatively more coherent in terms of its treatment of
authorship than the United States, since it does not conflate it with ownership.
Having said that, the Canadian Copyright Act is not
without its ambiguities and inconsistencies. For example,
subsection 10(2) of the Act deems the author of a photograph to be the person who owns the initial negative or,
if there is no negative, the owner of the initial photograph. A corporation who owns a photograph or negative may be the author of a photograph. This is an inconsistency that conflates authorship with ownership that
likely has its roots in a misunderstanding of the technology behind photography and the relationship photographers have with their cameras, and is an inconsistency that may soon be remedied. 64 An interim report
on copyright reform released by the Standing Committee on Canadian Heritage in May 2004 states:
The Committee feels that photographers should be given
copyright protection in their works equal to that enjoyed by
other artists. Historically, photographs have been treated differently from other categories of works because they were
perceived to be more mechanical and less creative than
other art forms. This idea is outmoded and inappropriately
treats photographers differently from other artists. 65
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One can see why this inconsistency in the treatment
of ‘‘authorship’’ came to be. Since it was believed (at the
time that subsection 10(2) of the Copyright Act was
enacted) that photographers were not authors (since they
did not clearly make original and expressive contributions to photographs), these works would not be protected under copyright unless someone was designated
the author. A copyrightable work requires an author.
That is why the notion of authorship is so important.
The only solution at the time was to deem the owner of
the photograph the author of the work; otherwise, no
copyright would subsist in photographs at all. As noted
already, this inconsistency is likely soon to be remedied,
as proposed amendments to the Copyright Act will
ensure that the photographer is the author of his or her
photograph.
There are three main points to note here. First, the
Canadian legislature has appeared to try to avoid conflating authorship with the vesting of ownership, by
defining ‘‘makers’’ for particular specific types of works
(such as cinematographic works). Thus, the concepts of
‘‘author’’, ‘‘maker’’, and ‘‘owner’’ are distinct from each
other. Second, nothing in the Copyright Act or in international treaties explicitly requires an ‘‘author’’ to be
human. Canadian case law also does not seem to preclude the possibility. Third, intelligent agents appear
capable of meeting the ‘‘originality’’ requirement in the
works they create. What then, should be done with
respect to works that are authored by intelligent agents?

use of ‘‘electronic agents’’ had been contemplated and
legislated for in the Uniform Electronic Commerce Act
(UECA), 68 but since the context for the drafting of this
legislation was Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) transactions, the UECA is not very useful when applied to
agents on the Internet. While ‘‘electronic agents’’ were
contemplated within the UECA, ‘‘intelligent agents’’ that
were more than an extension of human action were
not. 69 However, a number of commentators have considered the issues of ‘‘electronic agents as persons’’ within
the context of contract law, and their analysis is helpful
for thinking about the meaning of authorship and ownership in copyright law.

III. Canadian Copyright Policy

Fortunately, this debate does not have to be
resolved here. It is the owner who is the bearer of rights
and not the author. As a result, while questions such as
‘‘do intelligent agents possess the ability to process and
understand meanings?’’ may be relevant to the question
of ownership, they are not relevant to the question of
authorship. 73 A lack of consciousness or ‘‘intentionality’’
on the part of intelligent agents does not derogate from
their ability to produce works that meet the test of originality under Canadian copyright law. At the same time,
‘‘intentionality’’, consciousness, emotion, property rights,
and humanity are all concepts that may be relevant to an
inquiry into the qualities that make a bearer of rights one
that is afforded the protection of social institutions. 74
The relevance of such concepts in determining whether
an entity is a bearer of rights becomes clear when one
considers the assignment of legal rights to non-humans.
For example, these concepts would play a role in determining whether or not higher order mammals should
have stronger legal rights. 75 Thus a lack of ‘‘intentionality’’ and consciousness may be a barrier to the granting
of copyright ownership rights to intelligent agents.

Intelligent Agents Can Be Authors, But
Not Owners

I

n order to maintain coherence within copyright law,
authorship must be understood to be a distinct concept from ownership. As a matter of copyright doctrine,
it seems that information generated by intelligent agents
meets the requirements necessary for copyright protection. Apart from the fact that intelligent agents are not
natural persons, they appear to be good candidates for
being authors. However, it is not clear whether assigning
ownership of the rights associated with authorship to the
agent makes sense. The conflation of authorship with the
vesting of ownership and the confusion surrounding the
nature of the concept of authorship is exacerbated in the
context of intelligent agent technology because the term
‘‘agent’’ has a general legal meaning. One definition of
agency is ‘‘the relationship which results from the manifestation of consent, by one person to another, that the
other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control,
and consent by the other so act’’. 66 The phrase ‘‘intelligent agent’’ may be misleading, as it may carry such legal
connotations of the term ‘‘agent’’. 67
In Canada, there has been some attempt to legislate
with respect to emerging e-commerce technology. The

Cognitive science begins with the assumption that
the human mind is computational in nature, and thus
can be modeled as a computer program. 70 However, the
attribution of legal personality to entities embodied in
computer software is questionable due to the lack of
evidence of sentience or consciousness in such entities. 71
It is arguable whether or not intelligent agents possess
the ability to process meanings (an attribute referred to
as ‘‘intentionality’’). 72 For example, it is questionable
whether or not it can be claimed that the exercise of
summarizing news items gathered from the Internet
endows intelligent agents ‘‘skill and judgment’’. This may
just be a case of ‘‘skill and judgment’’ being displayed by
intelligent agents in producing useful outcomes that
have been designed by a computer programmer. This
type of philosophical debate has raged on for years in the
fields of artificial intelligence and cognitive science.

Pragmatic considerations relating to the assignment
of ownership to intelligent agents also help to illustrate
the distinction between authorship and ownership in
copyright law. First, who would enforce the copyright
owned by an intelligent agent if it were infringed? The

Intelligent Agents: Authors, Makers and Owners of Computer Generated Works in Canadian Copyright Law

intelligent agent has no standing to sue for damages in
court. 76 Secondly, an intelligent agent is not capable of
transferring rights to others. Even if it was conceptually
possible for agents to enter into licensing agreements
with each other and with humans, and to negotiate for
the transfer of rights, the assignment of copyright must
be in writing in Canada. 77
It seems then that an intelligent agent can be an
author, but not an owner. This is problematic because in
general, copyright vests first ownership in the author.
Policymakers have two options within copyright law to
deal with this problem. Either nobody owns any copyright in works created by intelligent agents, or the Canadian legislature will have to create a specific exception
for computer-generated works in the Copyright Act. If
the latter option is chosen, policymakers will need to
avoid conflating authorship and ownership to maintain
consistency and coherence in the Act. Thus the owner of
the copyright should take the form of a ‘‘maker’’. If specific laws are not enacted for computer-generated works
and intelligent agents, then it is not for the courts to
carve out an exception to the general requirement that
an author be given first ownership.
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There Is No Clear Legitimate Maker
For ownership over works created by intelligent
agents to vest in anyone, there must be a clear candidate
who would meet the requirements of being a ‘‘maker’’.
Interestingly, the Subcommittee on the Revisions of
Copyright stated back in 1985 that where data banks
were built up from elements from many sources and it
was impossible to identify human authors, ownership
should be vested in the individual or entity primarily
responsible for the arrangements undertaken for making
the compilation. 78 The output of an intelligent news
agent who summarizes information gathered from
numerous sources on the Internet is somewhat analogous to the hypothetical posed by the Subcommittee,
and the phrase ‘‘primarily responsible for the arrangements’’ is very much the same language used in the
definition of ‘‘maker’’ in section 2 of the Copyright Act.
Should Parliament extend the definition of ‘‘maker’’ to
address works created by intelligent agents?
With respect to computer-generated works, some of
the options that have been suggested for ownership by
commentators include
(a) the programmer/designer of the agent,
(b) the investor/owner of the agent technology, and
(c) the user of the agent. 79
In some sense, the programmer/designer appears to
be directly responsible for making the arrangements necessary for the making of the work. However, at the same
time, while the programmer is intimately tied to the
technology in question, he or she is also clearly divorced
from the particular works created by the agent. A maker
of a sound recording is involved with the selection and
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contracting of the artists who appear on the recording as
well as making other financial and technical arrangements; the programmer has little to do with a news
summary created by the agent and little control over the
agent. Granting ownership to the programmer is also
problematic for the reason that it would mean that the
programmer might automatically own everything the
program was capable of generating. 80
A case might be made for the investor/owner of the
intelligent agent technology. In the sense that an investor
has made financial and technical arrangements for the
creation of an intelligent agent’s technology, the investor
may be close to the definition of ‘‘maker’’ in the Copyright Act. However, the investor in this case has no hand
in the logistics directly associated with the generation of
the work that is to be protected. Makers of cinematographic works and sound recordings hire individuals to
create for them with a conception of what the final work
will be. More importantly, from a policy perspective, to
give ownership of the copyright to the investors should
make one pause and ask whether there is a point in
having copyright at all. The investor’s only hand in the
creation of the works is the provision of money. If copyright ownership is given to investors, then it seems that
instead of copyright law, we will have succeeded in creating ‘‘producers’ investment laws’’. 81
The users of intelligent agents likely have the best
claim for ownership as ‘‘makers’’. Users might be considered most directly responsible for fixing the work in
tangible form. 82 If users provide the computing hardware, telecommunications links, and electrical power
necessary for intelligent agents to create works, they
might be considered to be primarily responsible for the
arrangements undertaken to create the resulting works. 83
Users may also select, arrange, edit, and polish the output
of the intelligent agents. 84 Despite the fact that users of
intelligent agents might be the closest to meeting the
requirements of being a ‘‘maker’’ out of all other available options, they are still not clear candidates for being
brought into copyright legislation as such. For one thing,
unlike recording studios and movie production companies who make the market for creative works, the users
of intelligent agents are not ultimate market-makers who
take great financial risks for the creation of the works. 85
Additionally, it is not clear that users require further
incentive through copyright in the output of intelligent
agents, in addition to the copyright protection that the
user may claim in expression he or she personally contributes to the final product. 86
A natural tendency is to attempt to somehow fit
these works into the penumbra of rights within copyright to ensure that the works will be exploited. Put
another way, notwithstanding the fact that no human
author can readily be designated for such works, there is
a natural urge to vest the ownership right in somebody,
because of the commercial value the created work may
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have. 87 However, it may not really be necessary for copyright to vest in anyone.
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The Public Domain: Nobody Should be
the Owner
It has been argued that the output of an intelligent
agent is likely copyrightable, and that nothing precludes
the agent from being an ‘‘author’’. It has also been argued
that neither the agent itself (nor any other person) is a
particularly good candidate for owning the rights to the
information generated by the agent. The agent is not a
good candidate for practical and economic reasons,
while the natural persons associated with the works in
question are not proper authors or makers of the works.
The user of the intelligent agent appears to present the
best case for being a possible ‘‘maker’’ of the works.
Is there a good policy reason in favour of giving the
user ownership? It may be argued that the best reason to
allocate ownership to the user of the agent is to make
sure that the work is brought into public circulation and
should be done ‘‘if for no other reason’’ than this. 88 If
there is no copyright protection at all, it is argued that
nobody has incentive to share the work and may withhold the work from the public domain, 89 and that this is
not in the public interest.
But what exactly is the ‘‘public domain’’? Just as
there are many definitions of property, there are many
definitions of the public domain. 90 Professor Litman has
described the public domain as ‘‘a commons that
includes those aspects of copyrighted works which copyright does not protect . . .’’. 91 This description of the
public domain as an ‘‘information commons’’ is very
apposite in the context of information that is available to
intelligent agents on the Internet. Intelligent agents that
create news summaries from information gathered from
numerous sources on the Internet illustrate both the
type of raw material in the commons that authors rely
upon in order to create new works and how it is that
authors rely on such raw material. 92 The Supreme Court
has recently emphasized the necessity of a vigorous
public domain, and the role that authorship plays in
maintaining a balance between the public interest and
obtaining a just reward for the creator in stating that,
‘‘[w]hen an author must exercise skill and judgement to
ground originality in a work, there is a safeguard against
the author being overcompensated for his or her
work’’. 93
Some commentators have emphasized that the
public interest is not necessarily served by the public
domain. 94 This is likely true. Copyright protection is necessary in order to create incentives for the creation of
works that will populate the public domain. At the same
time, if the public domain is related to the concern that
excessive copyright may raise the cost of access to informational resources, then the public domain represents a
space that is bounded by the minimum intellectual
property rights necessary to provide incentives. 95 It is a
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continual balancing act between the benefit of incentives produced by copyright protection and the increased
cost of access to the very raw material that feeds new
works. Many commentators feel that the recent trend in
both Canada and the United States has been to expand
and strengthen copyright law as a knee-jerk reaction to
the challenges that digital technologies present, 96
resulting in what might be termed an ‘‘information arms
race’’. 97
To grant copyright to someone such as a user of
intelligent agents for no other reason than on the basis
that users of intelligent agents must be motivated to
bring the computer-generated works into public circulation 98 is an extreme proposal. The law and policy of
copyright always requires a balancing of legal rights with
the public interest and a consideration of the effect that
broadening the subject matter of copyright will have on
the public domain. Preferably, such consideration would
include economic analysis on whether such legislation
addresses an actual market failure or an actual lack of
incentives for production. 99
If none of the ownership options are suitable, the
user should not gain ownership simply because it is the
‘‘best of the worst’’ available options. It is important
when dealing with possible extensions of intellectual
property rights into new realms to ask whether these
extensions still bear the hallmarks of classic intellectual
property. 100 Ultimately, it is the creativity of authors that
copyright seeks to foster, and thus, to give undue weight
to the economic incentive that should be given to
‘‘makers’’ and ‘‘owners’’ would be a mistake. It is true
that there is a need to further innovation and investment, but to disproportionately value these aspects while
ignoring doctrinal difficulties means that we are no
longer within the proper ambit of copyright and may
actually be sacrificing the public interest by taking an
unbalanced approach to copyright.

IV. Database Protection

I

n theory, many of the doctrinal difficulties discussed
above might be alleviated through the introduction of
sui generis database protection laws. Database protection
laws would specifically protect the investment made by
database producers, which as discussed already, appears
to be the real thrust behind the argument that the assignation of copyright for works created by intelligent
agents to a person would be in the public interest.
The European Union (EU) adopted a Directive for
the legal protection of databases on March 11, 1996, 101
but Canada is unlikely to follow suit (at least anytime
soon). In a report released by Industry Canada on the
status and future of Canadian copyright reform, the issue
of database protection was deemed to be one that fell
within their most long-term reform agenda. 102 Even if
Canada were to adopt database protection laws, would
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the works created by an agent even qualify as a
‘‘database’’ under EU-like legislation? 103
A close reading of a set of four decisions released by
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on November 9,
2004 appears to show that information created by intelligent agents may not in fact fit the definition of
‘‘database’’ under EU database legislation. Cases C-46/02,
C-203/02, C-338/02, and C-444/02 all deal with sporting
schedules and fixtures used for the purpose of betting,
and are the first ECJ judgments to interpret the EU
database directive. 104 One of the key holdings of the ECJ
was that sui generis protection is reserved only for
databases for which it can be shown that there has been
a substantial investment in the obtaining, verification, or
presentation of their contents. The investment must also
have been made and used for seeking out existing materials and collecting them in a database (not for the creation of materials that make up the contents of a
database).
Thus, under EU-like database protection laws, there
is a need to make a distinction between collections of
information for which investment was made to collect
and verify existing materials (protected as a ‘‘database’’)
and for which investment was made for creating new
materials (not protected as a ‘‘database’’). In practice, this
may be a very difficult distinction to make. It certainly
has been the case that the demarcation between compilations and non-compilations under copyright in Canada
has been difficult to draw, 105 so distinguishing between
databases and non-databases may be just as difficult.
However, in all four judgments, the ECJ made it
clear that the purpose of the database directive is to
promote and protect investment in data storage and
processing systems for existing information, which contribute to the development of an information market.
Incentive to create materials that are capable of being
collected subsequently in a database is not the proper
subject matter of database protection laws in the EU. 106
As discussed in previous sections of this paper, the act of
summarizing news items gathered from the Internet is
the result of the exercise of skill and judgment. However,
if an agent’s activities are limited so that the agent will
only seek, collect, verify, and present existing materials,
then it is possible that such investment would attract
protection under database legislation.
These types of distinctions make eminent sense
from a broader information policy perspective. As noted
by one commentator, database law should focus on its
purpose, which is to serve the needs of commerce for
investment in commercial databases and avoid focus on
content protection. 107

Conclusion

S

ome commentators would argue that there is no
principled basis for not welcoming computer-generated works into the family of copyrighted works, and
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that copyright is flexible enough to deal with the legal
difficulties presented by intelligent agents. It is true that
copyright has ‘‘survived’’ the challenges that photography, sound recordings, and broadcasting have posed
for notions of authorship. 108 However, intelligent agents
reveal that copyright law, as malleable as it is, can only be
stretched so far. The idea that copyright is flexible
enough to incorporate computer-generated works was
mainly premised on the idea that artificial intelligence
technology had not reached a point where a machine (or
agent) could truly be considered an author. 109 Times
change.
In this paper, it has been argued that intelligent
agents are not prohibited explicitly from being ‘‘authors’’
under Canadian copyright law, and that they are capable
of creating ‘‘original’’ works as interpreted by Canadian
case law. International law also does not appear to prohibit the output of intelligent agents from being deemed
material that may be copyrighted. At the same time,
giving copyright ownership to intelligent agents leads to
an unworkable situation. Users of agents seem well-positioned to own the copyright, but from a doctrinal standpoint, they do not meet the requirement of authorship
under copyright law. They are also not particularly wellpositioned to be defined as ‘‘makers’’ by the Canadian
legislature, as that would be inconsistent with the intent
and policy goals of the Copyright Act. As a result, it is
concluded that the best solution is for no copyright ownership to be vested in anyone.
Preventing anyone from owning the copyright to
information generated by intelligent agents avoids incoherence in Canadian copyright law by preventing the
conflation of the notion of authorship with the notion of
ownership. It is also consistent with the need for the
author to be one who ‘‘[s]ucceeds in exercising minimal
personal autonomy in her fashioning of the work’’. 110
Autonomy is one of the fundamental characteristics of
agents exhibiting artificial intelligence, and while agents
cannot be rights bearers, it should be recognized that
they are the ones responsible for the originality of the
works that they create.
It is important to note that not giving copyright
ownership to anyone does not mean that there is no
longer any incentive for human users and creators to use
and create intelligent agent technologies. Investors and
programmers still have great incentive to develop new
technologies and license their use, as they may own the
intellectual property over the technology itself. 111 There
also still exists a great deal of incentive for human users
to use the intelligent agent to generate works. If the user
decides to extract commercial value from the output of
the intelligent agent, not having copyright ownership
over the output does not preclude the user from adding
expressive value to it. As a result, the user may claim
copyright in expression he or she personally contributes
to the final product, but not on the raw output of the
agent. 112 Thus, the user still has incentive to use the
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agent, extract commercial value out of it, and receive
copyright protection for the portion of the expression
that he or she has actually authored.
It might be argued that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to prove what original content the agent generated versus what valuable expression the user added, 113
but this is a question of evidence. Just because evidence
may be difficult to obtain does not render laws useless.
In fact, artificial intelligence technology itself may provide a solution, by offering some sort of audit trail. Digital rights management (DRM) technology has proven
that technological solutions can create some very strong
boundaries for a user’s manipulation of digital information. In fact, the effect of the existence of DRM and
technical protection measures (TPM) technology should
also be considered by policymakers when considering
copyright reform in this area.
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The aim of this paper is not to downplay the importance of copyright law protection. Rather, it is to serve as
a caution against a natural urge and intuition to assign
copyright to computer-generated works created by intelligent agents without having first made careful deliberation. Particularly where copyright protection is to be
potentially extended into new areas, context-specific economic analysis and empirical evidence of an actual
market failure may be quite helpful. If these works are
eventually brought within copyright law or some type of
sui generis intellectual property protection regime, it is
important that broader information policy perspectives
are understood to properly limit the scope of the protection given.
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